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by Jacob Huber

Welcome to the December edition of the EDI Quarterly! This issue
features contributions on unconventional gas and green gas.
Two perspectives from the US are presented, discussing issues
surrounding the exploitation of unconventional gas there in addition to
an explanation of the technical issues surrounding shale gas and an
overview of European developments. The section on biogas discusses
recent developments, a decision support tool for investments,
certification of green gas, and a perspective on injection into the Dutch
natural gas grid. Finally, a new section is devoted to brief summaries of
interesting conferences members of the Intelligence Unit at EDI have
recently attended.
The themes of the next Quarterly will be gas quality and smart grids.
Should any of our readers be interested in making a contribution in
either of these areas please contact us at the address that you can find
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Shale gas in Europe: replication
of American success or a concealed
illusion?
The shale gas revolution in the US is frequently cited
as one of the major highlights of the world’s energy
industry over the last decade. The growth in shale gas
production in the US since 2001 has led to significant
changes in the national energy market. Until recently
the United States appeared to be on the verge of becoming one of the world’s largest importers of liquefied
natural gas (LNG).
However, the development of two innovative technologies – hydraulic
fracturing and horizontal drilling – has enabled the economical
production of indigenous unconventional gas reserves in the US, leading
to the emergence of larger domestic gas supplies, mainly coming from
gas trapped in the shale formations (so-called shale gas). Today, shale gas
represents around 20% (4,87 trillion cubic feet or 138 billion cubic
meters) of the total US gas production, and it is expected to reach 50%
by 20351. This growth is astonishing given that shale gas represented
only 1% of the total US gas production in 20001. Due to shale gas
developments, overall US natural gas production in 2009 overtook that
of Russia, taking the world’s top producer position and transforming
what had been the largest gas consumer to a potential gas exporter2.
The successful development of shale gas in the US has intensified the
search for these reserves globally. With regard to Europe, recently several
European countries, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and others, have
begun looking to shale gas as a means of improving national energy
security and decreasing gas import dependence on Russia. Until now
several shale gas exploration activities have already been initiated in
Europe, however, the question whether the American shale gas success
can be replicated in Europe still ends with a big question mark.
This article aims at providing a broad overview of the shale gas potential
in Europe and its current developments, giving an insight into the main
challenges Europe might face with respect to shale gas production, and
how these compare to the situation in the US.

By Nadja Kogdenko
Energy Analyst, Energy Delta Institute

a significant breakthrough was reached only in 1991 when George
Mitchell, the American geologist, combined the techniques of horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, allowing greater yields of shale gas,
setting the stage for the American shale gas revolution4.
Inherently, the horizontal drilling technique allows a greater length of
the shale deposits to be in contact with the well bore, while hydraulic
fracturing produces cracks in the reservoir, enhancing the migration of
gas to the well bore. The use of these techniques was perfected by smaller
companies and by oilfield service companies , eventually building the
production of shale gas to levels where it became a significant part for the
US gas industry. Today, shale gas represents about 20% (138 billion
cubic meters) of the total US gas production, and it is expected to reach
50% by 20351.
The developments in the shale gas industry can be demonstrated by the
example of the Southwestern Energy Company practices in the
Fayetteville shale from the first quarter of 2007 until the second quarter
of 20096 (Figure 1). The figure shows that in just over two years, time
requirements for drilling one horizontal well decreased by 45%, while
the average length of a horizontal section of the well almost doubled,
resulting in a significant increase of the average shale gas production rate.
At the same time, the production costs (drilling and well completion
costs) remained nearly unchanged. This partly can be explained by the
fact that the production of shale gas in the US is located in a vicinity of
gas consumers, in this way omitting gas transportation costs. With these
improvements one rig could produce more wells on the annual basis,
overall resulting in more then five-fold increase of the annual shale gas
production6. This example might rise the question of the extent to which
shale gas resources are limited in the US. The US Energy Information
Agency (2011)12 estimates technically recoverable US shale gas reserves
at 862 trillion cubic feet (24,5 trillion cubic meters), which is about 3
times the amount of proven recoverable reserves of natural gas and 100
years worth of consumption at present rates of usage7,8.

Shale gas developments in the US

The idea of producing natural gas from shale formations is not new. In
small quantities, shale gas has been produced in the US since the 1940s3.
However, due to the low productivity of shale wells and high costs, the
production of this gas was considered a small-scale niche and therefore
did not attract much attention from oil & gas majors. In essence, shale is
an organic-rich sediment but, compared to a sandstone, which is a
conventional reservoir of natural gas, shale has low porosity and
permeability - poor properties for the production of gas and therefore
resulting in a low well productivity. Techniques for natural gas
production from shale formations have improved over time. However,

Figure 1. Efficiency improvement in shale gas production. Best practices of Southwestern Energy
Company in the Fayetteville shale formation 6

1 CERA (2010). Fueling North America’s Energy Future. The Unconventional Natural Gas Revolution and the Carbon Agenda. Special report. Cambridge Energy Research Associates.
2 Tallents, A. (2011). European gas supply and demand, and the outlook for shale gas. Analysis, Vol. 45. No.3.
3 Atlantic Council (2011). European unconventional gas developments. Environmental issues and regulatory challenges in the EU and the U.S.
4 Ivanov, N.A. (2010). Shale gas. FAQ. Material for the seminar “shale gas revolution: risks and opportunities for Russia”.
5 Gas Strategies (2010). Shale gas in Europe: A revolution in the making?
6 Dea, P.A. (2009). Abundant Natural Gas Supply. An American Treasure. Presentation materials at the ASPO 2009 International Peak Oil Conference. October 12, 2009.
7 Data on world’s natural gas reserves. Avalable at http://dolgikh.com/index/0-39

2

Figure 2. Projections of indigenous gas production and non-EU gas import for a panel of 25 EU
Member States (excluding Norway) 9

Trends in European gas supply

Facing the success story of shale gas developments in the US, various
countries around the world hope to duplicate this success in their own
territory.
With regard to Europe, indigenous reserves of natural gas are declining
and the following situation in gas market can be observed. In 2009,
natural gas accounted for 25% of the primary energy need in Europe
compared to only 10% in 1973, and this share is expected to grow in the
future . According to a study of Weijermars et al. (2011), natural gas
consumption in Europe is expected to reach 650bcm in 2020 and
680bcm in 2030, while its indigenous production will decline from
230bcm in 2020 to 140bcm (~130Mtoe) in 2030 (Figure 2). Statistics
of the International Energy Agency (IEA) show that from the 22
European OECD members, only Norway, Denmark and the
Netherlands still have sufficiently large gas reserves to cover domestic
demand10. This indicates that Europe is facing an increasing dependency
on gas imports, including intercontinental LNG and pipeline gas.
Already this year (2011), gas import accounted for nearly a half of
Europe’s gas supply, and it is expected to reach 80% by 20309. Altogether
this demonstrates the importance of shale gas development in Europe
for the reduction of growing gas import dependency and energy security
problems. However, there are many factors, which can hinder this
development and need closer consideration (discussed later). Currently,
exploration for shale gas across Europe is still in its infancy and no
production is foreseen in the short term.

current estimates of technically recoverable shale gas are higher than
GIIP estimates by Roger (1997) is partly due to the exclusion of Poland,
Hungary and Romania from Roger’s assessment (particularly Poland,
which holds a substantial shale gas resource base), since appraisals for
these countries were not available at that time. Other sources13,14, also
suggest that shale gas volumes are likely to outweigh the remaining
conventional gas reserves in Europe, however the exact number still
remains undetermined.
According to Tallents (2011), around 50 companies are currently active
in shale gas exploration in Europe, ranging from the majors, such as
Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total, Conoco Philips, and Chevron, to small state
oil & gas companies (Figure 3). The majority are involved in data
acquisition for appraisal purposes. A number of international oil
companies, led by Exxon, have already obtained exploration licences in
Poland, Hungary, Germany, Romania, Sweden and the UK, however,
most of the majors have focused on Poland, where there are significant
shale deposits with a geology similar to the Barnett Shale in Texas (first
play, where the economical production of shale gas begun)5.
From all European countries Poland holds the largest shale gas reserves,
nearly 5,3tcm10 (Figure 4). With the current annual consumption of
14bcm, of which only five billion are produced within the Polish borders,
shale gas reserves of such a scale could entirely sustain Polish gas needs
for centuries to come and enhance energy security across the Central
and Eastern European countries.
Given the country’s 70% gas import dependency on Russia, the
government is keen to support shale gas development by evaluating
reserves, offering attractive fiscal terms and issuing large numbers of
licenses2. Until the present, around 100 licenses have been issued to
international and state oil & gas companies for shale gas exploration and
production , however, the deputy minister Maciej Grabowski has
recently indicated that the potential commence of shale production can

European shale gas potential

The first estimates of Europe’s unconventional gas resources in place
were presented in a paper by Rogner (1997), who estimated some 1255
Tfc GIIP, of which 549Tcf (15,3Tcm) would come from shale gas and
remaining - from other sources of unconventional gas, such as tight gas
and CBM (coal bed methane)11. The recent study of the US Energy
Information Administration (2011)12, however, estimates 15Tcm of
technically recoverable shale gas resources in Europe. The fact that the

Figure 3. Shale gas exploration sites in Europe 2

8 Kefferputz, R. (2010). Shale Fever: Replicating the US gas revolution in the EU? CEPS Policy Brief No. 210. June 2010.
9 Weijermars, R., Drijkoningen, G., Heimovaara, T.J., et al. (2011). Unconventional gas research initiative fore clean energy transition in Europe. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering, 3, 402-412.
10 OECD/IEA (2010). Natural gas information 2010, International Energy Agency. 594 p.
11 Rogner, H. (1997). An assessment of world hydrocarbon resources. Annual review of energy and environment, 22, 217-262 .
12 EIA. (2010). World shale gas resources: an initial assessment of 14 regions outside the United States.
13 CERA (2009). Multi-client study, gas from shale-potential outside North America? HIS Cambridge Energy Research Associates. February 2009.
14 Geny, F (2010). Can unconventional gas be a game changer in European Gas Markets? Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
15 Overbeek, E. (2011). Shale gas doesn’t make Poland the new Norway yet. European Energy Review, June 14, 2011.
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Figure 4. Estimates of technically recoverable shale gas resources in Europe 10

be expected at earliest in 2015 . The development of Polish shale gas is
estimated to take longer than the US, partly due to the time needed to
gain expertise, a lack of pipeline infrastructure and the necessity to
address public concerns (discussed later).
Next to Poland, the Ukraine is also putting a lot of effort into
encouraging shale gas exploration activities, in order to decrease its
energy dependency on Russia. According to Tallents (2011), in January
2011, after resolution of several tax and licensing issues, it was
announced that Shell would start shale exploration activities in the
eastern Ukraine. TNK-BP is already exploring in the eastern Ukraine
with the state owned Neftogaz Ukrainy. Meanwhile, other international
companies are also getting involved in exploration activities in this
region. Recent data show that the first hydraulic fracturing test in
Ukraine has already been completed (the first of its kind in the eastern
European country), resulting in shale gas flow rates of around 65
thousand m3/day, which is a rather promising result.
Besides Poland and Ukraine, substantial shale gas reserves are found in
such European countries as France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the
United Kingdom, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Turkey,
Germany and Lithuania (Figure 4). However, there are various
challenges in the way of their development.

Europe’s main challenges

One of the major potential problems in Europe with shale gas
production is the geology, which is less promising than in the Unites
States . In general, shale deposits in Europe are deeper and the basins
themselves are smaller and more fragmented compared to those in the
North America. According to Stevens (2010), European shales are
richer in clay, making these deposits less amenable to hydraulic
fracturing and hence economically less attractive. Kefferputs (2010)
mentions that while the break-even gas price for some US shale plays is
estimated between $3 and $7/mmbtu, for Europe this number would be
above $10/mmbtu8.
Another major obstacle facing Europe with shale gas production is the
density of population, which is about 5 times higher than in the US. For
economically viable shale gas production, several drilling rigs and wells
are required to be placed relatively close to each other, together with new
road and pipeline infrastructures . In this regard, Europe simply does not
have much space compared to the US. In addition, Europe is lacking
experience with shale gas production and facing significant equipment
shortages. The US is a ‘home’ for many rig facilities companies and an
experienced drilling workforce. In 2008, the US had more than 2000
active onshore gas-drilling rigs while in Europe, as of April 2010, this
number was only around 1008.

Nevertheless, acceptance by local communities is likely to present the
major challenge for the developments of shale gas in Europe. Not only is
Europe more densely populated than the US, European citizens do not
have any financial benefits from shale gas production on their land in
comparison to the US situation. In the US, the mineral rights are owned
by local residents, which they can sell, making a substantial profit. (For
more about regulation, please read the piece by Professor Dianne Rahm
from Texas State University) For instance, in the New York State some
residents were offered $5500 an acre, with 20% royaltises on whatever
gas is extracted8. On the contrary in many EU countries these rights are
owned by the state, which leaves local residents with only few benefits8,19.
In addition, one could argue that environmental awareness in the EU is
higher than in the US, which could lead to a particularly strong public
opposition due to possible contamination of drinking water supplies.
Large quantities of water (about 20.000m3) in combination with sand
and chemical additives are required to fracture one well (more about
hydraulic fracturing, water use and environmental impacts of shale gas
production read in the article of N. Rop in this Quarterly edition). Even
though horizontal drilling occurs at a depth of around 1000 to 3000m
(depending on the shale formation) and the deepest aquifer layer which
could be used for drinking water purpose is located at around 200m ,
people have high concerns about potential groundwater contamination
by the chemicals used in the process of hydraulic fracturing. France,
which has the second largest shale gas reserves after Poland, has imposed
a moratorium on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing until
sufficient research on economic, social and environmental impact of
shale gas development is performed. This decision was based on the
strong opposition and protests from environmental organisations and
residents living in the vicinity of proposed shale gas development
activities2. In the US, this issue is also being raised more and more. For
instance, officials in Philadelphia also asked their state regulator to ban
hydraulic fracturing until its effects, particularly on drinking water, are
sufficiently studied8. Currently, the chemicals used in hydraulic
fracturing are exempted from the Safe Drinking Water Act of the US,
making the technology more easily exploitable compared to the EU,
where there is a set of strict environmental regulations2. At the moment
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is conducting a study
on the impact of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water, taking a full
life-cycle assessment into consideration. This study is expected to be
ready by 2012.

Concluding remarks

Despite the fact that several European countries have high hopes for
shale gas developments and therefore reduction of their energy import
dependency on Russia no shale gas production is currently taking place
within Europe or is foreseen to emerge in upcoming years. In line with
all the existing challenges, public acceptance currently remains the
primary one to the development of shale gas in Europe. In case the
current EPA research in the US concludes that hydraulic fracturing
technique indeed poses a real danger regarding groundwater
contamination and has other related environmental risks, this would
likely to slow down European shale development even more. Altogether,
it makes it fairly unlikely that a similar shale gas revolution will take place
in the EU in the near-term, transforming its gas market in a similar way
to that of the US.

16 http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article291801.ece
17 http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/polish-hydrocarbon-tax-in-2015-3776
18 http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/kulczyk-oil-ventures-announces-successful-fracking-in-ukraine-3324
19 Stevens, P. (2010). The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Hype and Reality. Chathamhouse. September 2010.
20 Barysch, K. (2010). Shale gas and energy security of the EU. Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, 18.
21 Halliburton (2008). US shale gas: an unconventional resource. Unconventional challenges. White paper. Available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/contents/Shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf
22 http://www.sjrwmd.com/watersupply/droughtproofwell.html
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Shale gas and hydraulic fracturing:
the issues explained
In various European countries, discussions have taken
place on the issue of whether the development of shale
gas should be encouraged or not allowed. The debate
mainly relates to the hydraulic fracturing technology
to make shale gas wells producing economically viable
amounts of gas. However, many people are still puzzled
about what exactly hydraulic fracturing entails and
how severe the environmental issues can be. This article
tries to explain the technology and shed some light on
the environmental issues.
Introduction

Shale gas has been produced in small quantities for decades. However,
because of the low productivity and relative high production costs shale
gas production has never attracted a lot of attention from the major gas
companies. More recently, large scale shale gas production has been
made possible because of developments in both ‘horizontal drilling’ and
‘hydraulic fracturing’ technologies.
Horizontal drilling is a technology to steer a drill bit into a horizontal
direction to provide increased wellbore exposure to a shallow reservoir
area while allowing for a reduced number of surface locations.
Horizontal drilling is a well understood and accepted technology. Figure
1 shows the difference between a horizontal and a vertical well.
The other technology, hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’, is becoming a
major point of discussion because of the risks involved concerning
ground water contamination and the use of large amounts of water.
To understand the need for hydraulic fracturing, first the differences
between conventional and unconventional gas production have to be
explained. Natural gas is formed by thermal transformation of an
organic-rich source rock. With conventional natural gas, the gas migrates
upwards until it is trapped in a porous reservoir from which it can be
recovered by conventional (i.e. vertical) drilling. Gas production from
conventional porous reservoirs has high productivity because the gas can
migrate easily through the reservoir to the well bore (Gas Strategies,
2010)

Figure 1: Unconventional versus conventional gas production (DTE Energy, 2011)

Niel Rop
Energy Analyst, Energy Delta Institute

Shale gas plays, and other types of unconventional gas plays, are
characterized by a source rock with low porosity and permeability where
the gas was formed, which in addition acts as the gas containing
reservoir. Because of the rock’s poor properties (i.e. porosity and
permeability), gas doesn’t flow to the well bore easily, and therefore
requires additional stimulation technologies like hydraulic fracturing.

What is Hydraulic fracturing?

Hydraulic fracturing is a technique in which a mixture of water,
chemicals, and sand are pumped into a well to unlock natural gas or oil
trapped in shale formations, by creating cracks (fractures) in the rock
and allowing the gas or oil to flow from the shale into the well. When
used in conjunction with horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing usually
enables gas producers to extract shale gas at a reasonable cost. While
production of many conventional gas wells have been stimulated using
hydraulic fracturing methods, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling
is specifically required for shale wells to be productive enough to provide
a sufficient financial return (Tyndall Centre, 2011).
The first step in drilling a shale gas well is drilling a vertical well until the
depth of the shale deposit, generally two to three kilometres deep (well
below usable groundwater aquifers). From here the drilling is redirected
in a horizontal direction for about two to five kilometres. Horizontal
drilling is necessary because shale gas layers are on average 200 meters
thick, and vertical drilling would not provide enough surface contact to
economically exploit the well. When the well is drilled and the well
casings, required to isolate the overlying zones and to guarantee well
integrity, are set, parts of the casing in the horizontal part of the well are
perforated to allow the fracturing fluids to come in contact with the shale
rock and to start the fracturing process. Next, a large amount of water
mixed with sand and chemicals is pumped into the well to increase the
pressure above the static level within the rock formation. When this
pressure is reached the well gets temporarily plugged to maintain the
pressure and achieve maximum fracturing results within the rock. The
water pressure opens up extremely small cracks in the rocks, ‘fracturing’
the rock. The sand is used to fill these cracks or fractures so that they
remain open when the pressure is relieved and chemicals are added to
assist in the process or to protect the equipment. After the well is
sufficiently fractured, the pressure is relieved and the water and
chemicals are pumped out. Because of the sand the micro fractures will
remain open and the gas can flow to the well more easily and faster
resulting in a more economic gas well. Figure 2 shows the different stages
in the fracturing process.

Figure 2: Hydraulic fractured horizontal well (not to scale) (Popular Science, 2011)
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Hydraulic fracturing of shale gas wells

Hydraulic fracturing is often referred to as a technology that has been
used for decades in conventional gas production, already starting in the
1940s. However, there are some major differences between the way the
technology was used now and in the past.
Hydraulic fracturing as it is now used on shale gas wells was developed in
the late 1990s. It is called “slick-water hydraulic fracturing” because it
uses a different mix of chemicals than the older methods, reducing the
amount of gelling agents and adding friction reducers, making the fluid
flow more easily. The modern technology is also known as “highvolume” hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) because it uses much more fluid
than the original hydraulic fracturing. With the original fracturing
technology, typically 75 to 300 m3 of fluids were used each time a well
was fractured, but HVHF uses on average 20.000 m3 of fluids, with as
much as 30.000 m3 of fluids to fracture a well, the exact amount
depending on the horizontal length of the well bore and the number of
fractures created along it (TC Gasmap, 2011).

Fracturing fluids

Fracture fluids can be based on water, oil, acid, gel, foam and even liquid
CO2. Most fracturing work is conducted using a water based fluid. In
addition, fracture fluids can contain a wide array of additives, each with a
particular function, the combination depending on the conditions of the
specific well being targeted. For deep shale gas zones, the water is
commonly mixed with a friction reducer (called slickwater), biocides,
scale inhibitors, and proppants such as sand to hold the fracture open. It
is the use of such additives that has raised concerns about hydraulic
fracturing, even though overall the concentration of additives in most
slickwater fracturing fluids ranges between 0.5% and 2%, with water and
sand making up 98% to 99.5% of the slickwater (Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, 2010). Geology dictates the combination of fracturing
fluids and proppant used, and part of the challenge of unlocking new
plays involves determining the optimal stimulation treatment. Figure 3
shows the typical make-up of a basic fracturing fluid, including the
different kinds of chemicals used.

Environmental impacts of shale gas production

A recent report of the Tyndall Centre (2011) assessed the possible risks
and impacts of hydraulic fracturing and shale gas drilling. Some key risks
and impacts directly relating to hydraulic fracturing were identified and
explained below:
• Groundwater pollution: The potential for contamination of
groundwater is a key risk associated with hydraulic fracturing.
Commonly used fracturing fluids contain multiple chemical additives,
some of which are toxic to humans. Groundwater pollution may occur
if there is a catastrophic failure or loss of integrity of the wellbore, or if
contaminants can travel from the target fracture through subsurface
pathways. The risks of such pollution were seen as minimal from
properly constructed wells. However, the risks related to less properly
constructed wells are less well documented and may be more
significant.
• Surface pollution: While it may not always be possible to pinpoint the
exact cause of groundwater contamination, identifying the source for
land and surface water pollution is more straightforward. There are a
number of potential sources of pollution including: well cuttings and
drilling mud; chemical additives for the fracturing liquid; and
flowback fluid, the liquid containing toxic chemicals that returns to
the surface after fracturing. There are various routes by which these
potential sources can cause pollution.
• Water consumption: Hydraulic fracturing requires very significant
amounts of water. To carry out all fracturing operations on a six well
pad takes between some 50 and 170 thousand cubic metres of water.
For the annual production of 5 bcm of shale gas over 20 years this
would boil down to an average annual water demand of 700-3000
thousand cubic metres.
• Disposal of flowback fluids: After a shale gas well is fractured, between
25 and 80% of the fluids will return to the surface before and during
gas production. These fluids still contain most of the chemicals
initially used, as well as heavy metals and radioactive elements from
the fractured layers. Treating or disposing of these fluids is expensive,
and if not done properly they can contaminate surface or drinking
water.
• Seismic events: Seismic events, or earthquakes, have in some instances
been reported to be caused by hydraulic fracturing (Daly, 2011).
Examples of earthquakes after hydraulic fracturing are small seismic
events in the UK (Vukmanovic, 2011), and a strong rise in seismic
events in Oklahoma, where a lot of fracturing has been performed
(Daly, 2011). However, these are only small events, and have always
been part of natural gas production and other sub surface industries.
The above risks directly associated with hydraulic fracturing are not the
only issues related to shale gas production, particularly when considering
relatively densely populated areas such as northwest Europe. More ‘run
of the mill’ impacts such as vehicle movements, landscape and noise
pollution may also be of significant concern locally, especially when
considering the scale of development required to deliver significant
supplies.

Technological developments
Figure 3: Sample Fracture Fluid Composition
(NYS Department of Environmental Conservation, 2011)

Even though it is commonly claimed that the chemicals used are
common household products they may still have an adverse impact on
the environment. For instance, some of the used chemicals are also used
in anti-freeze products.

Because of tightening regulations and growing public awareness of the
risks of hydraulic fracturing, the industry is working on better and
cleaner processes for hydraulic fracturing. However, not all of the issues
are easily solved, especially not those relating to the scale of the industry.
The new developments at this moment are mainly focused on limiting
the use of water and toxic chemicals. Limiting the use of water can be
done by:
• Better wastewater treatment and reuse, making it possible to use the
same water for multiple fracturing stages, and decreasing the net
amount of required water;
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• Using a foam as part of the fracturing fluid, potentially reducing the
required amount of water with up to 95% (Gies, 2011);
• Using liquefied propane gas (LPG) instead of water, which is actually
a thick gel. The gel purportedly turns to vapour underground, then
returns to the surface with the gas where it can be collected and
possibly reused (Gies, 2011).
For limiting the use of toxic chemicals, the fracturing companies search
for information about offshore fracturing fluids, which are not allowed to
be toxic to marine live, and so do not contain any toxic chemicals
(Earthworks, 2011). Off course, all of these measure will come at a cost,
making drilling more expensive.

Conclusion

Like every energy source, shale gas has its drawbacks. The process
involves injecting large amounts of water and chemicals deep
underground. If done right, this should not contaminate freshwater
supplies or cause other environmental problems. Rogue companies,
however have cut corners in the past, causing environmental problems
and contributing to increased controversy surrounding fracturing.
The problems relating to hydraulic fracturing are real, but according to a
variety of sources do not seem to be insurmountable. For instance, an
exhaustive study from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
concluded, “With 20,000 shale wells drilled in the last 10 years, the
environmental record of shale-gas development is for the most part a
good one” (Brooks, 2011).
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The Regulatory Framework for
Hydraulic Fracturing in Texas
The ability to economically produce natural gas from
unconventional shale gas reservoirs has been made
possible recently through the application of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Texas is a major
player in these developments. Of the eight states and
coastal areas that account for the bulk of U.S. gas,
Texas has the largest proved reserves.
Texas’ Barnett Shale already produces six percent of the continental U.S.’
gas and exploration of Texas’ other shale gas regions is just beginning.
Shale gas production is highly controversial, in part because of
environmental concerns. This paper explores the regulatory framework
for hydraulic fracturing of shale gas plays in Texas.
In its 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) estimates that the recoverable gas resources from
U.S. shale gas plays have more than doubled in the past year, in large part
due to the successful use of advanced drilling techniques. Indeed, the
report forecasts that by 2035 almost half (45 percent) of the natural gas
produced in the U.S. will come from shale gas, up from 14 percent in
2009 (Energy Information Administration, 2011). Over the last few
years new drilling techniques are remapping the energy future of the U.S.
These new drilling techniques have opened vast quantities of natural gas.
Estimates suggest these new reserves will amount to 616 trillion cubic
feet (17,248 billion cubic meters) -- about the same as Kuwait’s proven
reserves (Cox, 2010).
While conventional sources of natural gas are declining, unconventional
sources like shale gas are rapidly increasing. Instead of facing dwindling
reserves of conventional natural gas, the application of horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing (HF or fracking) techniques in shale gas
reservoirs has turned the U.S. from a nation of waning gas production to
one of increasing production. Texas is forecast to be a key state
contributing to U.S. natural gas supplies in the future.
The use of fracking and the gas drilling boom that has resulted from its
use has led, however, to some controversy and environmental worries.
Concern centers not only around air emissions and potential water
contamination associated with fracking chemicals used, but also around
the substantial amount of water necessary to make the wells productive.
Additionally, apprehension extends to chemical waste management
practices, the large land footprint of drilling operations, and the
necessary infrastructure required to support these large drilling
operations.

Why Texas Matters

The state of Texas contains five major shale gas plays and has assumed a
critical role in demonstrating the new HF drilling technology. The largest
of the Texas’ plays, the Barnett play, is located in north central Texas.
Nationally, this was the first play to be exploited. Between 2005 and
2007, almost all completed horizontal HF wells were successful in the
Barnett Shale play. Texas is also site of the Haynesville Shale play in the
eastern part of the state along the Texas-Louisiana border. This site is
expected to be the largest national producer over the coming decade.
The Eagle Ford Shale play, located just south of San Antonio, is the
newest site to begin production and is also expected to be a significant
producer. Texas also is home to the Barnett-Woodford Shale in the west
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and the Bend Shale play in the Panhandle.
Production of shale gas in Texas is increasing rapidly. In 2007, Texas
produced 988 billion cubic feet (27.66 billion cubic meters) of shale gas. In
2009, production rose to 1,789 billion cubic feet (50 billion cubic meters).
That production accounted for 57 percent of the 3,110 billion cubic feet (87
billion cubic meters) of shale gas produced in the United States that year
(Energy Information Administration, 2010). Estimates of proved shale gas
reserves within Texas continue to rise at the same steep rate.

The Regulatory Tangle of Texas

While other states have moved legislatively or administratively to control
shale gas drilling within their jurisdictions, the regulatory climate of Texas
has thus far prevented any similar action in the Lone Star State. Where some
efforts have been attempted, they have not gone far. The reasons are
interrelated and primarily due to the fragmentation of the regulatory
bureaucracy, a fundamental anti-regulatory disposition, and a wellentrenched legal and administrative structure that promotes oil and gas
extraction above other concerns.
In Texas, multiple commissions and authorities have a role to play in
jurisdiction over mineral, water, air, and land regulation. But unlike states
like California, that also have a fragmented structure, Texas does not have a
strong ethos of environmental protectionism. Moreover, under the
leadership of Governor Rick Perry, Texas has taken a decidedly anti-EPA and
anti-federal regulation position.
Within Texas, environmental pollution issues typically fall under the
jurisdiction of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. TCEQ is
the agency that deals with air and water quality issues as the state agency
given primacy for implementing federal clean water and air laws. TCEQ,
however, has recently found itself in conflict with the EPA over what EPA
considers lax enforcement of the federal Clean Air Act. In a most unusual
step, in March of 2010, EPA disapproved Texas’ air permitting exemption
program (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010a). The Qualified
Facilities exemption rule was submitted by TCEQ to EPA as part of the
required State Implementation Plan (SIP). The rule allows certain facilities
that have Texas permits to avoid following federal Clean Air Act
requirements. EPA rejected the permitting plan and told Texas to change the
SIP to bring it into compliance with Clean Air Act requirements (Galbraith,
2010). Texas refused and the standoff began. The Governor and the TCEQ
argue that the federal government is meddling in Texas’ business and is
involved in an unconstitutional overreach.
Tension between the TCEQ and the EPA escalated later in 2010 when Texas
became the only state to refuse to implement EPA’s greenhouse gas
regulations. While several other U.S. states have joined with Texas in suing
the EPA over its efforts to regulate greenhouse gases, Texas is the only state
that has refused to create a state program to implement the federal rules. In
December, EPA announced that it would seize authority and issue Clean Air
Act greenhouse gas permits in Texas because of Texas’ unwillingness to do so
(Michaels, 2010). Texas appealed to the courts and continued to fight the
EPA but as of November 2011, EPA began issuing greenhouse gas permits
for Texas.
EPA has pushed TCEQ to consider air emissions in the Barnett Shale.
Responding to complaints from citizens of Dish, Texas EPA began an
investigation of toxic air emissions in 2010. The TCEQ also conducted a
study of air quality in the Barnett Shale. They found elevated levels of
benzene and other chemicals. TCEQ recommended long-term monitoring
(Vaughan and Pursell, 2010). Subsequently, the TCEQ put in place a
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two-phase monitoring study to examine air emissions in the Barnett
Shale (Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2010). But drilling
continues.
Conflict with the EPA has spilled over to another Texas agency, the
Texas Railroad Commission. Under Texas law, the Railroad Commission
(RRC) regulates the oil and gas industry including pipeline transporters.
It is responsible for community safety and stewardship of natural
resources, while at the same time one of its missions is to promote
“enhanced development and economic vitality” (Railroad Commission
of Texas, 2011a). Given its dual purposes, some would suggest that the
missions of community safety and of stewardship of natural resources
fall victim to that of promoting the oil and gas industry.
The RRC has come into conflict with the EPA for its lax enforcement of
the Safe Drinking Water Act. In December of 2010, EPA issued an
Imminent and Substantial Endangerment Order to protect drinking
water in Southern Parker County. By this order the EPA ordered a
natural gas company operating in the Barnett Shale to take immediate
action to protect the water wells of local residents. EPA testing confirmed
the presence of flammable substances in the drinking water. By issuing
this order, the EPA trumped the RRC which had done nothing in
response to complaints from homeowners (Environmental Protection
Agency, 2010b).
Air and water quality issues are not the only regulatory concerns in
Texas. In an arid state like Texas, water quantity is a key issue. When it
comes to determining adequacy of water supplies, multiple authorities
exercise overlapping jurisdiction. These include the more than three
dozen river authorities and special law districts, multiple aquifer
authorities, nearly 100 Groundwater Conservation Districts, sixteen
Groundwater Management Areas, and seven Priority Groundwater
Management Areas, myriad water utilities, municipalities, and counties.
In addition, the Texas Water Development Board and its regional
planning committees are responsible for producing a 50 year plan for
water resources, updated every 5 years. However, when it comes to use of
groundwater use for drilling gas or oil wells, these regulatory bodies have
no authority.
The RRC allows a company to use as much groundwater as it needs to
complete a well (Railroad Commission of Texas, 2011b). Drillers that
wish to use surface water do need to apply to TCEQ for a permit. The
first such application was filed in 2010 for use of San Antonio River
water for a fracking operation in the Eagle Ford Shale. The permit seeks
65 million gallons a year for ten years (Harman, 2010). The use of such
vast amounts of water raises some concerns especially in dryer parts of
the state but thus far there are few attempts to control the water use.
Groundwater is specifically exempted from control under the state’s
water code.
In Texas, surface land property rights can be separated from mineral
rights and mineral rights supersede property rights. Natural gas is
classified as a mineral. The separation of surface rights from mineral
rights can happen in several ways. Either the landowner sells the
minerals but retains the surface or the landowner retains the minerals
but sells the surface. In Texas, the latter is more common. The language
regarding the terms of the sale is recorded on the deed. If the seller fails
to reserve the minerals when selling the surface, the mineral ownership
goes automatically to the buyer and the transaction is considered a fee
simple estate. Whether the surface and mineral estates are separated on a
tract of land or not, in Texas mineral rights are dominant. This is because
to benefit from the ownership of minerals, access to the surface of the
land is essential. If mineral ownership did not have priority over surface
rights in law, then mineral rights would be worthless for the mineral
owner could not enter the land to explore and extract the minerals
(Fambrough, 2009).
Because the surface of the land must be disturbed so that minerals may
be accessed, this can create a tension between surface land property
owners and mineral rights owners. It is important to note that often the
same individual owns both the surface and mineral rights, in which case

no conflict would ensue. Mineral rights owners are permitted by Texas
law to lease the rights to explore for oil and gas to a company which in
turn must provide the surface land owner a notification of intent to
explore and drill. In Texas, though, the surface land owner cannot block
the mineral rights owner from access to the minerals. Mineral rights
owners can use as much surface land as is reasonably necessary to
explore, drill, and extract minerals. The mineral rights owner is allowed
by Texas law to clear trees and remove fences so that drilling rigs can be
brought to the property. Once gas is discovered, the mineral owner can
bring in extraction equipment on a dedicated pad that can be an acre or
more in size. The mineral rights owner or lessee may also erect pipelines
for the removal of minerals. Texas law does not require the mineral
owner or lessee to pay for damages to the land or to pay reparations for
the loss of use of the land while the drilling operation is in place (Woods,
2010).
In Texas, private gas pipeline companies have been given the right of
eminent domain by state statute, which in practicality allows them to lay
lines where ever they choose. That interstate pipeline companies have
the power of eminent domain is established in federal law. Interstate
natural gas transmission pipeline companies were given the power of
eminent domain by the federal Natural Gas Act of 1938. An interstate
pipeline company may use the power of eminent domain if the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has issued a certificate of
public convenience and necessity for a pipeline project and the company
has not been able to successfully negotiate a purchase price with the
property owner (Arntsen and Simmons, 2009). Intrastate pipelines are
generally regulated by state Public Utility Commissions. States vary on
the authority given to intrastate pipeline operators. In most states,
intrastate pipelines and gathering pipelines -- lines that take the gas from
the wells to a larger transmission line -- do not have eminent domain
authority (Killion, 2010). In Texas, however, pipeline companies have
considerable sway.
In Texas, pipeline operators and gas utilities have the power of eminent
domain. The Railroad Commission does not have any right to regulate
any pipeline with respect to the exercise of eminent domain (Railroad
Commission of Texas, 2010). If a company wants to cross private
property to lay a pipeline, they are allowed to do so. If they take the
entire property through condemnation, they were required under the
1936 case State v. Carpenter to provide fair market value for the land
(Brannan and Peacock, 2010). However, in 2004, the Texas Supreme
Court ruled in Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co. that the
dollar amount of the condemning agent’s offer does not have to align
with fair market value for the land. Further, even if the party whose land
is being taken wins in a court appeal, the attorney fees and appraiser fees
cannot be recovered as part of the judgment (Fambrough, 2010). These
aspects of Texas policy make opposing mineral development difficult
and costly.

Conclusion

Taken together these provisions and actions constitute a very friendly
environment for oil and gas producers in the state of Texas. Unlike
actions in other states and at the federal level to control horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, Texas remains pretty much “the wild
West.” The fragmentation of the Texas regulatory bureaucracy, a
fundamental anti-regulatory disposition of the TCEQ and the Governor,
and the well-entrenched legal and administrative structures that promote
oil and gas extraction above other concerns make Texas a strong
pro-drilling state. While land owners who lease their mineral rights to oil
and gas companies stand to gain significant income from such leases,
once the lease is negotiated landowners have few protections. How much
water will be used, the disposal of wastewater, and the footprint of
drilling operations are not under their control. What will remain of the
rural land that passes to future generations is unclear. And urban dwellers
who find themselves unexpectedly living in a gas field will have to deal
with the development and production.
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The Economic Impacts of Shale Gas
Extraction: Moving Beyond Jobs
and Tax Revenues
After decades of speculation, recent advances in drilling
technologies coupled with high prices for natural gas
have made it economical to extract natural gas from
shale rock formations deep below the surface of the
earth. The process, which involves horizontal drilling
and the hydraulic fracturing of shale rock, requires the
construction of drilling pads, large quantities of water
to fracture the shale rock, and methods for treating or
disposing the water that returns to the surface.
Because such unconventional gas reserves often lie below regions
previously familiar to the energy industry, and because potential threats
to the natural environment are not well understood, policy makers face
large uncertainties over how best to prepare for and regulate the industry.
Responses have varied dramatically within the United States. The
governments in Texas and Arkansas, states already familiar with the
conventional (shallow well) gas extraction industry, largely relied upon
existing regulations. But in the state of New York, where the gas industry
traditionally has had little activity, a moratorium on unconventional gas
extraction was enacted until more could be learned.
Of particular interest to policy makers in all regions are the expected
economic benefits associated with the new industry. Job creation, state
tax revenue earnings, and overall economic growth typically top the list
of economic impacts of interest. The Economic Impact Report is a
particularly useful tool for estimating these impacts, and the gas industry
often funds the research behind these reports. But the Economic Impact
Report involves several layers of subjective decision making, overlooks a
host of other relevant economic impacts, and is based on a core
economic theory that may not be appropriate in all cases. This article
explains how the Economic Impact Report is generated, discusses some
of the weaknesses of the practice, and then introduces some of the other
known economic consequences of unconventional gas extraction that
could prove important to policy makers.

The Economic Impact Report

Many policymakers, private consultants, and academic and professional
economists are familiar with the Economic Impact Report. These reports
estimate the jobs, gross revenues, and tax revenues associated with the
economic activity of a single firm, a single institution, or any particular
industry. Economic impacts result from the direct, indirect, and induced
economic activity associated with the firm, institution, or industry.
Direct economic effects are estimated by simply examining the financial
statements of the firm or industry. All revenues earned, jobs created, and
taxed paid are said to have a direct effect on the economy. Indirect
economic effects occur when the firm or industry purchases supplies,
raw materials, and labor resources from other firms in the economy. This
spending indirectly contributes to the jobs, revenues, and taxes paid by
these other firms. Induced effects arise after incomes earned from the
beneficiaries of the indirect spending are then spent again and again
throughout the economy. These induced effects are estimated using

Thomas C. Kinnaman
Professor and Chair
Department of Economics, Bucknell University
Lewisburg, PA 17837
570-577-3465
kinnaman@bucknell.edu

multipliers generated from any number of input-output models created
by professional economists.
A number of Economic Impact Reports have been produced to estimate
the economic benefits of unconventional gas extraction in the United
States.1 The intended audiences of these reports are often local and
regional policy makers. If policy makers can be convinced that the new
industry will generate sufficient increases in jobs, tax receipts, and
economic growth, then those policy makers may be less likely to
implement safety and environmental regulations. Also, because these
impact reports can specify the economic benefits within any defined
state or region, they especially match the political interests of many state
policy makers.
That direct, indirect, and induced spending might generate broad
economic prosperity originated with the theories of the British
economist John Maynard Keynes in the 1930’s. Keynesian economic
theory is most appropriate for understanding economies operating
below capacity when economic resources are underemployed, such as
during the Great Depression and during the present ongoing recession.
Although Keynesian economic theory is an important part of the
curriculum at many colleges and universities across the globe and
remains important to both modern empirical and theoretical research,
academic research economists have abandoned the practice of writing
Economic Impact Reports. Such reports are no longer considered
economic research suitable for publication in the academic journals.
Instead private consulting companies and academic economists looking
to make a few consulting dollars on the side author Economic Impact
Reports for clients in industry and government.
One reason for the lack of interest from professional research economists
for the Economic Impact Report is the high level of subjectivity inherent
to the practice. For example, important to the estimate of the indirect
effects to any specific region is determining the portion of a firm or
institution’s overall spending on resources from local, rather than non
local suppliers. The purchase of an imported automobile from a local car
dealership will likely have a different economic impact than the purchase
of a domestic automobile from the same dealership. But the economist
might only be given the zip code of the car dealership when determining
whether a purchase is local or not and is therefore unable to distinguish
between these two purchases. With thousands of purchases per year, the
process of identifying truly local suppliers may become impossible. Also,
once the indirect spending from local vendors is “estimated”, then the
induced effects are estimated by selecting an appropriate spending
multiplier from several possibilities with little guidance over which
multiplier is most appropriate. Finally, the output of the Economic
Impact Report assumes no crowding out – all economic resources
employed to support the firm or industry’s spending are otherwise idle
and therefore not reallocated from other sectors of the economy. This
last assumption may only be appropriate in an economy awash with
unemployed economic resources. In combination, these sources of
subjectivity allow the economist substantial leeway when completing an
Economic Impact Report, reduce the process from a science to perhaps
an art, and result in the repeated use of the word “conservative” in the
report to attempt to convince the reader that wherever judgments were
made, options were pursued that minimized the economic impacts.

1wFor a detailed review of these reports, see “The Economic Impact of Shale Gas Extraction: A Review of Existing Studies,” published in Ecological Economics 70(7), May 2011, 1243-1249.
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But perhaps the most disappointing aspect of traditional Economic
Impact Statement involves what is omitted. First, who wins and who
loses? A new industry may drive some existing firms and industries out
of the economy while others may emerge. These details are usually of
interest, but Economic Impact Reports by design suggest everyone will
benefit from the extra spending. Second, the sustainability of the
estimated economic impacts is ignored. Will the economic benefits be
short lived or long lasting? Third, the economic impact report fails to
consider the national and international benefits and costs that mat
originate from a firm, institution, or industry.
The remainder of this article attempts to address these additional
questions. Data from the United States Economic Census are
summarized in the next section to see what effect the maturing industry
has had on the state and local economy. Have the benefits touted by the
Economic Impact Reports been realized? A description of the specific
winners and losers, as identified in the economics literature, is then
provided in the section that follows further below. The final section then
summarizes the broad benefits and costs to the national and global
economies stemming from this industry.

Moving Beyond the Economic Impact Report

Rather than relying upon spending forecasts to understand the
economic impacts of the unconventional gas industry, Table 1
summarizes observed economic variables both before and after the
initiation of the industry in U.S. states both with and without the
industry. All data are obtained from the United States Economic Census,
which is taken every five years. Two time periods are reported. The first
time period, from 1997-2002, predates almost all unconventional gas
activity in the United States. The second time period, 2002-2007,
featured significant mining activity in both the Barnett shale play in
Texas and the Fayetteville shale play in Arkansas. The limited data points
are woefully insufficient for making any statistical inference about the
overall economic impact of the industry. But if the industry is
responsible for sizeable economic gains, then these data should recover
something.
Extraction from the Fayetteville shale play in Arkansas began in 2002.
Prior to 2002, employment in the mining sector of the economy grew by
an average annual rate of 4.52% in the state of Arkansas (the first row of
Table 1). Gross revenues to mining companies grew by an averaged
annual rate of 3.12%. Both of these measures increased sharply in the five
years between 2002 and 2007. Employment in the mining industry grew
by an average annual rate of 13.59% and gross revenues to the mining
industry grew on average by almost 40% per year. This rapid increase in
average growth rates within the mining sector also emerges in Texas, site
of the Barnett shale play since 2001.
At question is the extent to which this rapid growth within the mining
industry extends to the broader state economies. Table 1 also has the
pre- and post-2002 average employment and gross revenue growth rates
for the states of Arkansas and Texas. Similar data are also obtained for
the states of New Mexico and Tennessee, two south-central states
adjacent to Texas and Arkansas but not served by the unconventional gas
extraction industry. The average annual growth rate of employment
decreased in both Arkansas and Texas after 2002, as was the case in New
Mexico. Unobserved macroeconomic variables are likely the reason. But
if the decreases observed in Arkansas and Texas are less severe than the
decreases in Tennessee and New Mexico, then the new unconventional
gas industry could be responsible for relative gains in economic
performance.
Using the differences in differences approach, the economies of Texas
and Arkansas together experienced a 0.97 point decrease in the average
growth rate in employment. Tennessee and New Mexico experienced an
averaged 1.78 point decrease. If no other economic variables affected
these latter two economies any differently than the economies of Texas
and Arkansas, then we can conclude that the unconventional gas
industry was responsible for an annual 0.8 point increase in the growth

rate of employment between 2002 and 2007. The Arkansas economy
employed 926,150 workers in 2002, thus the 0.8 percent annual increase
suggests the addition of 7,409 jobs per year created by the uncon
ventional gas industry during the 2002 to 2007 period. The Economic
Impact Report for the state of Arkansas (published by the Center for
Business and Economic Research of the University of Arkansas)
predicted the addition of 9,533 jobs in Arkansas. In terms of gross
revenues, the differences in differences approach suggests that gross
revenues in Texas and Arkansas grew at an average rate that exceeded
that in Tennessee and New Mexico by 3.25%.
Table 1: A Comparison of State Economic Indicators
Location

1997-2002

2002-2007

Arkansas - Mining Industry
Employment: 4.52%
Fayetteville Shale (Began 2002) Revenues: 3.12%

Employment: 13.59%
Revenues: 38.98%

Texas - Mining Industry
Barnett Shale (began 2001)

Employment: 17.28%
Revenues: 20.45%

Employment: 1.52%
Revenues: 4.17%

Arkansas - All Industries
Employment: 1.16%
Fayetteville Shale (Began 2002) Revenues: 2.18%

Employment: 0.97%
Revenues: 9.41%

Texas - All Industries
Barnett Shale (began 2001)

Employment: 4.41%
Revenues: 2.52%

Employment: 2.67%
Revenues: 12.51%

New Mexico - All Industries
No Shale Activity

Employment: 6.21%
Revenues: 3.46%

Employment: 2.61%
Revenues: 11.00%

Tennessee - All Industries
No Shale Activity

Employment: 1.13%
Revenues: 3.07%

Employment: 1.18%
Revenues: 6.25%

Employment and gross revenue data are also obtained for specific
counties within Texas and Arkansas, and are reported in Table 2. Within
Arkansas, unconventional gas extraction from the Fayetteville shale play
occurs in both Faulkner and White counties but not in Garland or Saline
counties. The differences and differences approach when applied to these
two sets of counties suggests the average growth rate in employment
decreased by 4.98% in the shale counties and decreased by only 0.99% in
the non-shale counties – contradicting the results based on statewide
data given above. These data suggest the unconventional gas industry is
responsible for a 3.99 point decrease in the employment growth rate in
these two counties. A decrease of 0.27 points is estimated using counties
in Texas. A comparison of the growth rates of gross revenues suggests
shale counties in Texas and Arkansas also experienced lower growth in
gross revenues that counties without shale.
Thus, the data suggest that state economies grow but local (countrywide) economies suffer from the unconventional gas industry. But
problems are associated with these conclusions. First, unobserved
economic variables may have affected the shale states and counties in
ways that differ from how they affected the non shale states and counties
– the appearance of the shale gas industry may not be the only difference
between these sets of states and counties. Statistical techniques could be
utilized to control for these other variables, but such techniques require
larger data sets than are reported in Tables 1 and 2. And because the
industry is rather new, such data are not yet available. Thus, the actual
impact the industry is having on the local and state economies remains
largely unknown.

Specific Economic Impacts Associated with Unconventional
Gas Extraction

Moving beyond the impact on aggregate economic performance, the
remainder of this essay summarizes what we have learned about the
specific economic impacts within various sectors of the economy. The
literature is admittedly thin at this point as post-industry data are only
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Table 2: A Comparison of County Economic Indicators
Location

1997-2002

2002-2007

Faulkner, AR - All Industries
Employment: 6.63%
Fayetteville Shale (Began 2002) Revenues: 4.49%

Employment: 2.13%
Revenues: 5.67%

White, AR - All Industries
Employment: 4.82%
Fayetteville Shale (Began 2002) Revenues: 5.86%

Employment: -0.63%
Revenues: 3.33%

Garland, AR - All Industries
No Shale Activity

Employment: 0.58%
Revenues: 1.73%

Employment: -0.95%
Revenues: -0.23%

Saline, AR - All Industries
No Shale Activity

Employment: 0.78%
Revenues: 0.53%

Employment: 0.34%
Revenues: 0.37%

Denton, TX - All Industries
Barnett Shale (began 2001)

Employment: 5.44%
Revenues: 15.56%

Employment: 5.03%
Revenues: -1.32%

McLennon, TX - All Industries Employment: 0.49%
No Shale Activity
Revenues: 7.64%

Employment: 0.35%
Revenues: -1.39%

now becoming available to researchers. The most thorough examination
of the economic impacts of the industry is performed by Susan
Christopherson of Cornell University. The full report is available at
http://www.greenchoices.cornell.edu/development/marcellus/. Some
of these results are summarized below.

Economic Effects on Landowners

The majority of unconventional gas reserves lie below privately owned
rural property. In order to access these natural gas sources, mining
companies must first gain permission from the surface land owners. The
typical contract includes both a lease agreement and future royalty
payments. The lease agreement stipulates a monthly amount paid to the
landowner for permission to construct a mining pad and access road.
Royalties are then paid on each unit of natural gas extracted at the site.
These lease and royalty agreements are usually kept confidential in the
short run. Thus, neighboring property owners can negotiate very
different terms. Lease payments have ranged substantially between just
$50 to as much as $7,000 per acre per year. Royalty agreements have
varied between 12% and 21%. Although the process yields a few
overnight millionaires, the average landowner receives a few thousand
dollars per year. Furthermore, a well pad on a property has been
estimated to reduce the value of the property by 8.67% in Garfield
County, Colorado. Apparently prospective land buyers are unimpressed
by the mining activity on the property.
Neighboring landowners whose surface property may not be conducive
to drilling due perhaps to inadequate size, severe land grade, or flood
plain issues must experience the nuisance of drilling on neighboring
properties without gaining lease or royalty revenues. Although economic
studies estimating these external costs have not materialized in the
literature, studies estimate that each well pad involves an estimated 890
to 1,340 truck trips. Related economics literature has estimated that
vehicular traffic negatively affects adjacent property values.

Economic Impact on Housing

The unconventional gas mining industry typically imports trained labor
from other regions of the country. Short-term housing demand therefore
increases sharply. Rents have been estimated to increase by 60% in the
short run in some rural areas. Vacancy rates plummet, and many
low-income residents are displaced by the industry. These effects are
most noticeable in medium sized municipalities large enough to be
attractive to the imported labor force but not large enough to offer
sufficient quantities of housing.

At question is how long the increase in housing demand will persist.
Studies of housing values suggest a boom/bust cycle may accompany the
industry. Once well drilling and pipe line construction has been
completed in any specific area, the imported labor force migrates to
another region. Experiences suggest this cycle takes about 6 years to
complete. For example, in Grand Junction, Colorado, vacancy rates
decreased from 10% in 2004 to 2% in 2008 with the emergence of the
unconventional gas industry. But vacancy rates then increased back to
10% between 2008 and 2010. The same pattern emerged in Glenwood
Springs, Colorado as vacancy rates decreased from 6% to 1% but then
back to 4% over the same time frame. No such cycle exists in state-wide
data for Colorado.
Housing prices followed this same pattern. Again in Grand Junction,
Colorado, housing prices traditionally grew at about the state average of
2% per year. With the emergence of the unconventional gas industry,
housing prices began to grow by 10% more than the state average
between 2003 and 2008. But since 2008, housing prices decreased by
double digit percentage rates even as the state average held steady. These
observations suggest the increased demand for housing associated with
unconventional gas extraction is short lived.

Impact on Public Services

The emergence of the unconventional gas industry in rural regions of the
country can put unexpected pressures on public services. Many
municipalities can absorb rates of population growth of up to about 6%
to 7%. Systematic institutional breakdowns occur with population
growth rates of 15%, a rate that can accompany the new industry. Health
and education systems, road maintenance, emergency services, social
services, public administration services, and environmental monitoring
services are most sensitive to the emerging industry.

Impact on Local Labor Markets

Most new employment opportunities for the local labor force associated
with the unconventional gas industry are in trucking. Aggregate
materials for pad development, tools and supplies for drilling, and
pipeline construction materials require the use of trucks. Once the
drilling begins, trucks are needed to transport water and drill casing
materials. Trucks are also necessary for transporting earth and waste
water for proper disposal (in some cases over long distances). The
demand for trucking is so intense in some areas that other industries
relying on trucking services are affected. The dairy industry is
particularly crowded out in many rural regions. Other local employment
opportunities associated with the unconventional gas industry are in
food service and hotel/motel accommodations.
But the high-skilled well-paying jobs are usually reserved for imported
labor forces that have developed long lasting relationships with the
mining company. These workers construct the well pads, construct the
pipelines, operate the drilling process, and capture the gas. Although
local labor forces could be trained to fill some of these jobs, the
transitory nature of the industry would eventually take local employees
to other parts of the country once they become skilled in the industry
– a form of brain drain that might likely result from any investment in the
local labor force.

Crowding Out

The impact on the dairy industry mentioned above is one form of
economic crowding out that can occur with the emergence of the
unconventional gas industry. Crowding out can also be associated with
land used by the industry. First, farm production has been shown to
decrease as local farmers cash out after agreeing to a long term lease and
royalty contract. The result is less food production. Empirical evidence
in Pennsylvania also suggests speculative landowners are less likely to
convert agricultural land to housing subdivisions if gas extraction may
occur in the region. Instead the land is preserved for possible use by the
extraction industry. Thus, the local home construction industry may be
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affected. Evidence also suggests that tourism decreases with the
emergence of the industry. Not only are overnight accommodations
difficult to find, but the replacement of natural vistas with a patchwork of
drilling pads, access roads, and pipelines makes the region less suitable
for fishing, hunting, camping, and hiking. The drop in tourism dollars is
most acute in rural counties.

A Broader Perspective on Economic Impact

From a national or global perspective, the benefits and costs associated
with the unconventional gas extraction industry appear very different
than at the local perspective. Local jobs and tax revenues play no role. At
question is whether the value society places on the gas itself exceeds the
private and external costs of extraction. If gas is valued, perhaps because
the winter is cold or other fuels are not available, then the benefits of

extraction are large. If the extraction process is resource intensive or if
environmental spillovers are substantial, then the social costs may exceed
the benefits. Damage to roads and infrastructure, nuisance to neighbors,
cyclical economic upheaval, and climate consequences of adding fossil
fuels contribute to the external costs. External benefits accrue if the
extracted natural gas replaces other fossil fuels with large environmental
costs.
If the industry internalized all of these benefits and costs, then profit
maximizing decisions of extractors are consistent with maximizing
societal net benefits. A severance tax set equal to all marginal external
costs minus all external benefits will allow for such internalization.
Mining companies willing to pay the tax in addition to the private
extraction costs extract gas only if that gas generates net gain to society.
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EDIAAL
Developments in
the green gas sector
This section of the Quarterly is fully dedicated to green
gas. We made this choice because there are currently
many interesting developments in the green gas sector. Even though green gas only has a very marginal
contribution to the overall energy supply in the Netherlands (around 30 million m3), this share is expected to
increase significantly in the future.
On the 6th of 2011 September Green Gas Netherlands foundation
(GGNL) was launched to increase the production volume of green gas.
They intend to do this by pooling knowledge and practical experience
and to use this combination to help accelerate developments in the green
gas sector. In addition they stimulate new projects and will propose
solutions to existing bottlenecks. GGNL has an ambitious target of
multiplying the total production volume of green gas by ten, from the
current 30 to 300 million m3 (mcm). Between 2014 and 2025 they intend
to multiply production tenfold again, from 300 mcm to 3 billion m3.

Steven von Eije
Energy Analyst, Energy Delta Institute

were submitted by aspiring green gas producers. Based on these requests,
the minister responsible for the SDE+, Maxime Verhagen, decided to
change the amounts available for green gas and green electricity. Of the
total budget, two thirds is now available for green gas production.
Unfortunately, green gas production is still far more expensive than the
production of natural gas. While natural gas was traded at an average of
€0.1992 in 2010, green gas produced by co-digestion still costs around
€0.62 per m3. In order to significantly increase green gas production, the
production costs will have to decrease. Several developments are
underway with the aim of lowering the production costs of green gas and
some of them deserve to be highlighted here.

Green gas hubs

In the Netherlands several initiatives are underway to exploit the
potential economies of scale in upgrading biogas to natural gas quality (it
is then called green gas), and this is accomplished by building so called
“green gas hubs”. The first certified green gas hub is located in Tilburg3
where Attero produces biogas from a landfill which is then upgraded to
green gas. In addition, the biogas from a nearby wastewater treatment
facility is upgraded at this location. In total 7 initiatives are underway in
the Netherlands to create green gas hubs. In the contribution of Kirsten
van Gorkum, biogas hubs are described in more detail (See “Green gas
injection in practice from a regional grid operator point of view”).

Decision Support Tool for investments in the gas distribution
system

Figure 1: Maxime Verhagen (minister of EL&I) and Ulco Vermeulen (Chairman GGNL),
source: GGNL 1

This year’s Dutch stimulation grants for sustainable energy production
(SDE+) also favoured green gas production. Of the total available
budget of €1.5 billion, initially 50% was available for green gas
production. Within several days the entire SDE+ budget had been
requested by aspiring renewable energy producers. Since the system
favoured the cheapest sustainable energy generation production, far
more aspiring green gas producers requested subsidy than aspiring
renewable electricity producers and more than two thirds of the requests

In order to accommodate green gas in the existing natural gas grid many
investments are necessary. Investments vary from green gas hubs, biogas
transport pipelines, connection to either the distribution or transport
grid for natural gas, and associated compression capacity. The optimal
choice, both from a CO2 and financial viewpoint, differ per situation.
Taede Weijdenaar, a PhD student from the University of Twente is
currently working on a decision support tool to aid in this decisionmaking process. This tool is described in ” Development of a Decision
Support Tool for Investments in the Gas Distribution System.”

Valorisation of manure

The Netherlands is currently importing a large amount of feed for
livestock, and the minerals present in the feed that is imported remain in
the manure the animals produce. If this manure is used to produce
biogas, these substances remain in the digestate. Both manure and
digestate present a problem to Dutch farmers, since they are only
allowed to apply a limited amount of these minerals on their land for
fertilization purposes, and often the excess manure must be removed
from the farm for fertilization application elsewhere. Both manure and

1 http://groengas.nl/2011/09/06/oprichting-groen-gas-nederland-overgang-naar-groen-gas-begonnen/
2 http://gasterraverslag.nl/2010/nl/jaarverslag/jaarrekening_2010/Jaarrekening_2010.pdf
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digestate contain a lot of water, which makes transportation prohibitively
expensive, and removal of digestate adds a considerable amount of costs
to the production of biogas.
In the recently published report by LTO Nederland, a vision is presented
on how this liability can be turned into an asset4. They foresee this taking
place in the coming years, saving greenhouse gas emissions and creating
a market for the byproducts of biogas production. Manure and digestate
contain valuable minerals and compounds such as potassium, nitrogen
and phosphorus. Phosphorus is vital to world food production and is
becoming increasingly scarce. Due to this, phosphorus in particular
could become a very important value added product associated with
biogas production.
If LTO Nederland’s vision is realized this could considerably lower the
costs of biogas production.
In addition this would strengthen the position of green gas in the
upcoming bio-based economy, where all biological materials will have to
be optimally utilized.

Gasification

In order to really scale up green gas volumes, anaerobic digestion will not
suffice. To really increase the amount of green gas production,
gasification is required, and this technology is still under development.
ECN, Taqa, HVC and the province of ‘Noord Holland’ will invest in a
demonstration gasification project of 12 Megawatts. The demonstration
project is planned to become operational in 2013, and in 2017 it is
expected that this will be followed by a larger scale commercial gasifier
on the order of 50 – 100 Megawatts5.

MOU

Looking beyond the Dutch borders there are also some interesting
developments taking place. A memorandum of understanding was
recently signed between Gazprom, Gasunie, Eurotechnica and
BioGazEnergostroy. In this MOU these parties announced their
intention to cooperate in the development of green gas in Russia and to
make the benefits of that production available to the European Union.6
According to Alexander Medvedev, the vice-chairman of Gazprom’s

Figure 2: From left to right: Ludmila Orlova, Paul van Gelder, Alexander Medvedev and Sergei
Chenin. Source: Gasunie 6

management committee, Russia may be able to produce up to 35 billion
cubic meters of green gas in the long run. In the last Quarterly I wrote
about the amount of green gas that could realistically be expected in the
near future in the Netherlands and came to the conclusion that it would
be a relatively small contribution. If Russia were to realize their full green
gas potential and if this green gas could be made available to the Dutch
market, this picture would drastically change.
As described by Geert Joosten later in this issue, international trade of
green gas is only possible if certification of green gas between trading
nations is sufficiently harmonized.

Domestic biogas in developing countries

Biogas can also play an important role in developing countries.
Organisations such as Hivos and SNV are implementing large scale
domestic biogas programs in developing countries.
In Asia and Africa small scale biogas installations are providing
renewable energy to rural households. Biomass is often freely available to
rural households in the form of manure, whereas fuel for cooking is often
absent or comes at a relatively high cost. Since the average ambient
temperature in these regions is higher than in Europe, no additional heat
is required to keep the digestion process going, and no expensive and
complex technology is required. While biogas production in the
Netherlands still requires subsidies, the decision to invest in a domestic
biogas installation will yield an IRR of over 50% for a Tanzanian
household. Besides providing cooking fuel, biogas can also provide light
in the form of a very simple gas lamp, thereby extending the day in case
an electricity grid is not present.
If biogas replaces fuelwood, the cleaner burning biogas prevents
respiratory problems for both women and children (the women often
work in poorly ventilated kitchens while looking after their children).
The presence of a biogas installation also improves sanitary conditions,
and the impact is even larger if the household’s toilet is connected to the
biogas installation. Finally, for many crops, it turns out that digested
manure results in a higher yield, increased crop prices and less need for
the addition of chemical fertilizer and pesticides.
The benefits of domestic biogas installations are widely recognized in
countries such as Vietnam where almost 25 000 biogas plants have been
installed in 20107.
Despite the high potential returns after investing in a domestic biogas
installation, the (relatively small) investment in a domestic biogas
installation is often problematic due to a lack of financing options
available to rural households.
Dutch utilities are in a good position to create a win-win situation. As
long as national green gas production is insufficient to deliver green gas
to households which would be willing to pay a premium for CO2 neutral
natural gas, this gas consumption could be compensated by enabling
biogas production in developing countries. The biogas would not have to
be physically delivered to the Dutch households, but a certification
system would be required in order to ensure that the biogas is actually
produced in developing countries, thereby displacing fossil fuel and
preventing methane emissions from manure storage. Next to providing
customers with affordable, CO2 neutral natural gas, this would improve
the livelihoods of poor farmers in developing countries.

5 http://groengas.nl/projecten/groen-gashubs/overzicht-groen-gashubs/
6 http://www.lto.nl/media/default.aspx/emma/org/10760429/integrale+visie+duurzame+drijfmestverwaarding+visie+van+lto+nederland+augustus+2011.pdf
7 http://www.snvworld.org/en/ourwork/Documents/SNV%20Domestic%20Biogas%20Newsletter%20-%20issue%204%20-%20January%202011.pdf
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Green gas injection in practice
from a regional grid operator
point of view
Manure, sewage, waste in landfills, organic waste,
and other types of biomass can all be used to produce
biogas. Biogas is produced in many different places
in the Netherlands and throughout the world. This
gas is usually converted directly into electricity with
combined heat and power plants (bio-CHP), unfortunately in most cases the generated heat has no useful
application. For optimal and sustainable utilization of
the biogas it must be transported to locations where the
full energy of the gas can be utilized.
As the Netherlands has one of the most-effective natural gas grids in the
world, this grid could also be utilized to transport biogas upgraded to
natural gas quality.
Upgraded biogas is injected into the Enexis grid at 5 locations: Wijster,
Tilburg, Groningen, Well and Witteveen. This biogas is produced from
both organic material in landfills and organic waste, which has been
collected separately. Crude biogas must be upgraded to natural gas
quality before it is injected in the natural gas grid and when the gas is
upgraded to natural gas quality, it is called green gas. The production of
renewable energy is a hot topic today. Based on its mission to facilitate
the energy transition, grid operator Enexis is working hard to simplify
the injection of green gas in the gas grid.

Green gas and the gas grid

Upgrading crude biogas to natural gas quality guarantees the safety and
integrity of the grid and end-users equipment. Green gas, renewable gas
upgraded to natural gas quality, must therefore meet the ‘Additional
requirements for green gas injection into the regional gas grid,’ a set of
requirements developed by the collective of Dutch grid operators
together with biogas producers. This is done to safeguard the interests of
both producers and consumers of natural gas in The Netherlands.
The Dutch natural gas grid is designed to provide gas from a central
location (e.g. the gas field of Slochteren) to the end-users. This means
that the amount of gas that needs to be injected depends on the amount
of gas consumed at the end of the grid. Next to the gas quality
requirements sufficient consumption on that part of the grid is necessary
to inject green gas. The presence of a pipeline connection to the grid
from a biogas plant with green gas does not “automatically” lead to
smooth injection. The amount of green gas which can be injected into
the grid equals the amount of gas that is consumed by the end-users
connected to that part of the grid.
In the Netherlands most of the green gas is produced in rural areas which
are not densely populated. This means few customers and a limited
amount of gas consumption. Especially in summer, the demand for gas is
low, since gas is mostly used for heating houses. It is often in summer
that there is a mismatch between the demand and supply side. Priority
for green gas cannot be compared with priority for renewable electricity.
Where electricity producers can be switched off to create space for green
electricity producers, for gas the question whether green gas can be
injected depends on the demand by end-users.

Kirsten van Gorkum
Innovator Biogas Enexis

How to increase injection possibilities?

The future is one with sustainable energy supply. In this future the role
for green gas is identified by Enexis. Multiple solutions are currently
being explored by Enexis in order to increase possibilities for green gas
injection and to break through the supply-demand mismatch.
1 Longer connection pipelines to a grid with a sufficient gas
consumption
2 Back-feeding of the surplus gas into the national grid (higher pressure)
3 Collection pipeline with central upgrading (biogas hubs)
In Zwolle Enexis cooperated with the national grid operator GTS in a
pilot project called ‘Natuurgas Overijssel’, (a joint venture of the waste
processors ROVA and HVC). An 8-bar connection pipeline connects the
production site to a compressor from which the connection is made to
the 40-bar grid of the national grid operator GTS. The party that injects
the green gas in the grid carries the costs of the connection pipeline and
the compression of the gas. Since these costs are relatively high, a long
connection pipeline is not usually a viable option for smaller biogas
producers when faced with capacity problems.
Currently a study is being performed concerning back-feeding surplus
gas to the national grid which is operated at a higher pressure. In
summertime or when more producers request a connection to the
regional grid and gas consumption is lacking, a large compressor feeds
the excess gas from the regional grid (8 bar) back into the national grid
(40 bar). In order to use as little energy as possible, discussions are
taking place between the regional and national grid operator to operate
the national grid at a lower pressure during summertime, when smaller
volumes need to be transported. Even though discussions concerning
responsibilities and financial models are still taking place, Enexis is
working on a back-feeding pilot in Groningen to learn more about the
technical possibilities and operational issues in practice.
The third category of ‘increasing injection possibilities’ are also put in
practice by Enexis. In the northeastern part of Friesland, in Wijster and
the area of Salland, biogas hubs are being developed. In rural areas,
transporting the biogas to a central location - a biogas hub – seems to be
an obvious solution. Several producers inject biogas into a central
pipeline which transports the gas to either an industrial consumer or an
upgrading facility that upgrades the biogas to green gas quality for
injection into the natural gas grid. Upgrading biogas to green gas is a very
costly process. For smaller projects it is almost impossible to create a
viable business case since the upgrading facilities that are required to
produce green gas require large investments. A biogas hub may offer a
solution here.
In order to secure the safety of the maintenance engineers and the direct
surroundings of the upgrading facility, safety requirements are set. This
means that raw biogas cannot freely be transported through a biogas
pipeline and not just any pipeline can become a biogas pipeline. In order
to be transported safely it has to meet to the specifications that have been
set for biogas. The biogas must meet the maximum water dew-point and
components like water sulphate and ammonia must be limited. A biogas
hub is more than the technical engineering of an infrastructure.
Commitment of local-, regional- and national government, producers,
financing parties and grid operators is necessary next to the willingness
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to invest in a concept of which the risks – both commercial and technical
– are not all visible. The project in the North-Eastern par of Friesland is
unique as the upgraded green gas, 6500 m3/h, will be injected in the
national grid (40bar). Enexis and Stedin have taken care of the basic
engineering, the permits and licenses and will invest in the biogas hub.
Producers are willing to commit themselves to the project and are
waiting for the necessary subsidies from the Dutch government (SDE+),
as without subsidy this project would not yet be financially feasible. The
biogas hub in Wijster has received part of the required subsidies and the
Salland biogas hub is still in the development phase. For the
development of a biogas hub many parties, sometimes competitors, must
all work together.

Biogas hubs and pipelines

Biogas as such is not covered in the Dutch Gas law, nor is a European or
national norm formulated regarding the operation and management of a
biogas pipeline. In the present situation biogas pipelines and hubs can be
developed by any commercial party. Even though it concerns a
free-market activity, in practice few are in development and the ones that
are progress slowly.

Enexis could perform a vital role in providing biogas infrastructure
activities for two reasons. (1) The fact that the activities are not adopted
by the commercial market and (2) because of its impecable track record
in safe and reliable gas transportation and distribution. Finally, it is very
likely that the regional grid operator will be approached in case of
failures and leaks of a pipeline with a gas-like-substance and where safety
must be served. For these reasons, Enexis advocates that construction
and maintenance of biogas infrastructure should become one of their
statutory duties.

Conclusion

The most suitable solutions for the sustainable use of biogas depend on
the location and specific situation. In close cooperation with market
participants Enexis will assess the optimal solution for each specific case.
This cooperation goes further than the statutory duties in order to
address the challenges arising from the transition to a more sustainable
energy supply.
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Development of a Decision Support
Tool for Investments in the Gas
Distribution System
Introduction

It is expected that the share of bio-methane in the Dutch gas supply mix
will increase significantly in the next decade – from the current 0.1% to
12% in 2020. The bio-methane supply chain is shown in Figure 1. In the
first step, the biomass is produced and subsequently transported to the
digester installation – the biomass consists of manure and a co-substrate,
e.g. maize. In the study presented in this article, biomass is supplied by
farmers. The digestion process produces biogas consisting of 50-65%
methane – for comparison Dutch natural gas consists of 83% methane.
In the subsequent step, upgrading, unwanted components are removed
and the methane content is increased, in order to obtain a gas with
burning properties similar to that of natural gas.

Taede Weidenaar
PhD student at the department of Engineering
Technology, University of Twente

The case study

Figure 2 shows the layout of the 8 bar grid of Zutphen. The blue arcs
indicate the pipelines, and the blue squares indicate the district stations,
which in this model are considered to be the gas consumers. In the
vicinity of Zutphen there are several farmers with biomass available for
bio-methane production, they are indicated with black plusses. The 8 bar
grid, the gas consumers, the farm locations, and the biomass availability
for each farm are loaded into the DST.

Figure 1: Bio-methane supply chain [3]

Due to the small scale of bio-methane installations, it is economically
not efficient to inject the bio-methane in the national transport grid.
Therefore, the bio-methane is likely to be injected in the gas distribution
grid. The gas distribution grid is traditionally not used as a feed-in point
for produced gas, and the injection of bio-methane in the gas distri
bution grid leads to several challenges. Among others, the gas demand in
the distribution grid may not be sufficient to take up all the bio-methane
produced, especially in the summer when gas demand is at its lowest.
Furthermore, if one or more farmers want to use their biomass to
produce bio-methane, it should be investigated how and where each step
of the bio-methane supply chain takes place. One option is to perform
each step of the supply chain at the farm site for each individual farmer.
However, the digestion and upgrading equipment is expensive. It might
therefore be beneficial to share the investment of, for instance, an
upgrading plant with several farmers and consequently lowering the
investment costs for the upgrading plant per farmer. Though investment
costs for the upgrading plant are lowered in this way, it also incurs extra
costs, since a pipeline has to be laid to transport the biogas from the
digester to the upgrading plant – or in case a digester is shared, the
farmer should transport the biomass to the digester. Hence, a trade-off
has to be made between these different costs [1].
The preferred configuration is largely dependent on the specific
situation, and therefore the choice regarding the best option varies from
situation to situation. Therefore, we are developing a Decision Support
Tool (DST) that gives location specific advice regarding investments in
bio-methane projects.
In this article, we present the prototype of the eventual DST we are
developing. By means of a case study[2], we explain the basics of the
DST. In the case study several farmers in the vicinity of the city of
Zutphen would like to use their biomass to produce bio-methane.
The produced bio-methane will be injected in the natural gas grid of
Zutphen.

Figure 2: 8 bar grid of Zutphen and the farms with biomass available for bio-methane
production

Once all the data is loaded into the DST, it starts to explore a great
number of potential solutions to utilize the biomass. The solution should
preferably minimize the yearly costs and maximize the CO2 reduction
achieved by replacing natural gas by bio-methane. For this step, the DST
uses building blocks to generate solutions. The building blocks the DST
uses are:
• Truck: To transport the biomass from the farm to the digester station
in case the biomass is not digested at the farm site
• Pipelines: To transport biogas from the digester to the upgrading plant
in case these two steps are not performed at the same location
• Digester station: Converts biomass into biogas that contains 57%
methane
• Upgrading plant: Converts biogas into bio-methane, i.e. natural gas
quality
• Injection station: Compresses the gas to 8 or 40 bar and by means of a
pipeline feeds the bio-methane in the 8 bar grid, or the gas receiving
station (connected to the 40 bar grid) respectively
The DST places and scales the building blocks when generating potential
solutions.
For this study, 10.000 possible solutions were generated. For each
solution, the yearly costs and the yearly CO2 emission reduction were
determined. Among the 10.000 solutions there is not a single solution
that optimizes both performance indicators. However, several solutions
can be considered “pareto optimal”; a pareto optimal solution is a
solution for which there cannot be found another solution with a better
performance indicator without deteriorating the other performance
indicator. Figure 3 shows the set of pareto optimal solutions derived
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from the total set of 10.000 solutions. It can be seen that reducing more
CO2 on a yearly basis leads to higher yearly costs. Therefore, when
deciding on the preferred solution, a trade-off has to be made between
yearly costs and yearly CO2 emission reduction.

Figure 4: Example of a generated solution

Concluding remarks

Figure 3: Performance indicators of the pareto optimal solutions

To illustrate what kind of solutions the DST generates, Figure 4 shows
one of the solutions that is pareto optimal. As can be seen, in this
solution, sometimes the biomass is transported by truck – which is
indicated by a dashed green line – to a digester further away. For
instance, the biomass from the farm in the top left of the figure is
transported to the neighbouring farm where a digester installation is
located. The biogas produced at this location is transported by a biogas
pipeline – indicated with a red line – to a central upgrading plant –
yellow circle. In this configuration, one upgrading plant is shared by all
the farmers. At the location of the upgrading plant, the gas is also
compressed to the appropriate operating pressure in the injection station
– magenta square – and subsequently injected in the 8 bar grid of
Zutphen.

Lessons learned

The case study showed that the DST is a useful tool to provide insight in
the available investment options. Once the starting configuration is
loaded into the DST, it generates a multitude of solutions. The plots
easily shows how each solution performs compared to the others. Hence,
the tool promises to be of great added value to the Distribution Service
Operators (DSOs).
In order to increase the added value of the DST for the DSOs, it needs
some further improvements. First of all, a number of performance
indicators will be added to increase insight into the available solution
space; among others, we will add yearly green gas volume produced,
investments required in the gas grid, and the energy balance for each
solution. Secondly, the user interaction of the tool should be significantly
improved.

The developed prototype is a first step towards a DST which will have
more functionality. In the eventual DST we will incorporate different
types of foreign gas. Furthermore, interaction between the electricity
grid and the gas distribution grid – e.g. the injection of hydrogen in the
gas grid to buffer the fluctuating energy supply of solar PVs and
windmills – will be incorporated.
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1 T.D. Weidenaar, S. Hoekstra, M. Wolters, Development options for
the Dutch gas distribution grid in a changing gas market, Proceedings
of the 2011 IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing
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2 T.D. Weidenaar, S. Hoekstra, M. Wolters, Dutch gas distribution grid
goes green: decision support tool for local biogas utilization,
International Gas Research Conference Proceedings, Seoul, 2011
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Certification of Green Gas

Most of the biogas produced in the Netherlands is used
to produce green electricity, however the waste heat of
the gas engine often cannot be used effectively because
of the remote location of the production sites. In that
case the overall energy efficiency of the production
chain is very low. When the biogas is treated to a gas
quality that can be fed into the public gas grid (it then
is called green gas) the overall energy efficiency is considerably higher. This has been rewarded in the Dutch
SDE+ subsidy and biogas producers have shown an
keen interest in the production of green gas under this
scheme. If all projects awarded in 2011 are realised the
yearly production volume of green gas would increase
by more than 195 MCM.
Feeding green gas into the grid dramatically increases the number of
potential customers : all companies and private persons connected to the
grid. However, after being fed into the grid, green gas mingles with the
fossil gas and cannot be distinguished from it. To be able to trade and sell
green gas it is essential to have a certification system. In this system a
certificate is issued for each MWh of green gas that has been fed into the
grid. The sale of green gas takes place by delivering (mainly fossil) gas
from the grid plus the corresponding number of certificates. There need
not be a physical connection between the points of injection and
consumption other than that they both are connected to the public gas
grid. The certificates guarantee the green origin of the gas.
It is clear that the trust market parties have in the certificate system
hinges on the reliability of the certificate’s issuing body. Customers must
not have any doubts whatsoever regarding such questions as: was the
green gas actually fed into the grid, was the gas actually of a green origin,
can no double counting of certificates take place etc.
In the Netherlands Gasunie has founded a certificate Issuing Body (IB),
Vertogas. Vertogas takes all possible measures to guarantee the validity of
the certificates. Examples of these measures include the strict application
of rules to the accuracy of the energy metering, that each certificate is
uniquely numbered, that it states the identity of the production site, the
date of production, the nature and origin of the feed that was used to
produce the green gas, whether subsidy was received in the production
process etc.
The practical operation of the system is as follows. A producer of green
gas asks Vertogas to register his installation. Vertogas then carries out a
physical inspection of the plant and an audit of the procedures for
production and transfer of the necessary information to Vertogas during
the operation phase of the plant. After approval by Vertogas the producer
can start to feed green gas into the grid. He chooses a trader to which he
sells the green gas. The trader receives a certificate for each MWh of
green gas fed into the grid. The metering of the number of MWh is
carried out by an independent metering company. The latter transfers the
metering data to Vertogas. Vertogas keeps a kind of “bank account” of
certificates for each trader. A trader can sell his certificates to another
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trader. They inform Vertogas of the deal and the certificates are
transferred to the account of the new owner of the certificates. Of course
the trader can also sell green gas to an end consumer. When doing so
Vertogas cancels the corresponding number of certificates from the
trader’s account.
At present not all gas labelled green is traded via the Vertogas
certification system. This is confusing for the customers and may be
detrimental to the public’s trust in green gas. It is a positive development
that minister Verhagen recently announced that Vertogas will be given a
legal status in the near future.
In the Netherlands there is no certification system for biogas as such.
This is a pity because the direct use of biogas, for example for heating, is
an economical way of using the energy released from biomass. Hardly
any treatment of the biogas and compression needs to take place, so
avoiding considerable costs. This results in a low price per MWh.
The users of biogas may want to claim the green nature of the biogas. In
that case the certificates are cancelled when the gas is used. Via the IB
the user can prove that he has burned gas from a renewable source.
Alternatively, the user may not desire to use the green claim himself, but
want to sell the green value of the biogas to somebody else. This is
possible via the certificates.
We recommend that a study is carried out investigating whether and
under what conditions a biogas certification scheme can be set up in
parallel to the green gas certificate system. Requirements for the
protocols of certification should be defined.
Another possible step is the international trade of green gas. Certain
countries, e.g. Germany, have a high production level. The demand for
green gas may be large in other countries, creating an interesting market
for green gas abroad. It is clear that this international trade will take place
via certificates: the certificates are traded, rather than the physical gas.
The trade of certificates should go via the Issuing Bodies in both
countries. The traders in the exporting and importing country inform
their IB that a trade has been arranged, and the national IB of the
exporting country then cancels the corresponding number of certificates.
Finally, the IB in the importing country generates new ones in his
national system for the importing trader.
Essential in this scheme is that the certificates in both countries are
representing the same green properties of the gas, i.e. they are
interchangeable. The simplest way to realise this is by having identical
rules for green gas in both countries. At present rules vary across Europe.
This need not rule out the possibility of international trade, provided the
essential rules are identical. To arrange this bilaterally between countries
is probably easier than for the whole of Europe, especially as the
Renewable Energy Directive does not apply to green gas. A good start
may be to enable trade of green certificates between Germany and the
Netherlands. Once up and running more countries may join the scheme.
A positive development in this respect is that Vertogas and DENA in
Germany are discussing these kinds of possibilities. The same holds for
the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Gasunie and
Gazprom plus Biogazenergostroy in Russia. They will study the
possibility to export Russian green gas (certificates) to the Netherlands.
There are interesting times to come for green gas.
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Recent Publications
Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2011. Breaking new
ground: A special report on global shale gas developments.
The Economist.

Worries about climate change are deepening in many countries.
Proponents of gas, which burns cleaner than coal, suggest that it could be
part of the answer—but preferably indigenous gas, for the sake of energy
security. At the same time, even as energy demand surges ahead, the
giants of the oil industry are finding it harder than ever to tap new
reserves, which is forcing them to look to previously neglected,
harder-to-reach hydrocarbons. Among these, previously disregarded
shale gas reserves are generating the most enthusiasm. The groundwork
for this has been a remarkable upswing of activity in the US, where over
the past decade innovative techniques have propelled shale gas from
irrelevance to a position where it now makes up one-quarter of all natural
gas production. And although the shale gas story has been
overwhelmingly a US one to date, the search for shale is accelerating
around the world. This special report brings together a collection of
recent articles looking at fledgling shale gas developments worldwide,
with a focus on the countries thought to hold the largest reserves.
This report is available at: http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.
aspx?campaignid=shalegas

International Energy Agency, November 2011. World Energy
Outlook 2011.

The World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2011 brings together the latest data,
policy developments, and experience of another year to provide robust
analysis and insight into global energy markets, today and for the next 25
years. This edition of WEO gives the latest energy demand and supply
projections for different future scenarios, broken down by country, fuel
and sector. It also gives special focus to such energy sector issues as: 1)
Russia’s energy prospects and their implications for global markets; 2)
the role of coal in driving economic growth in an emissions-constrained
world; 3) the implications of a possible delay in oil and gas sector
investment in the Middle East and North Africa; 4) how high-carbon
infrastructure “lock-in” is making the 2°C climate change goal more
challenging and expensive to meet; 5) the scale of fossil fuel subsidies
and support for renewable energy and their impact on energy, economic
and environmental trends; 6) a “Low Nuclear Case” to investigate what a
rapid slowdown in the use of nuclear power would mean for the global
energy landscape, and 7) the scale and type of investment needed to
provide modern energy to the billions of the world’s poor that do not
have it.
This book is available at: http://www.iea.org/w/bookshop/add.
aspx?id=428

Katja Yafimava, November 2011. The Transit Dimension of EU
Energy Security: Russian gas transit across Ukraine, Belarus
and Moldova. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

This is the first book to provide an in-depth analysis of market, legal/
regulatory, and energy security aspects of the transit of Russian gas to
Europe across western CIS countries – Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova
– to Europe. The book analyses how EU transit, and hence energy,
security is affected by the governance structures of the Eurasian gas
network and by asymmetrical power relations between its actors, in
particular between Russia and western CIS states and their national gas
companies. The book views the Eurasian gas network as the overlap and
interaction of four spaces: the regulatory space, the contractual space, the
space of flows, and the space of places. It concludes that discontinuities

between and within the spaces adversely affect EU gas transit security,
and suggests ways of reducing these discontinuities and minimizing their
negative effects. Threats to the security of Russian gas transit across
western CIS countries are identified, and reasons for unresolved Russia–
western CIS bilateral issues which led to the appearance of these threats
are explained, as are reasons why existing bilateral frameworks (supply
and transit contracts and intergovernmental agreements) proved
inadequate to ensure security of transit. EU energy policy gaps are
identified, and the reasons which reduced the Union’s ability to deal with
such threats, and the ways in which transit security could be
incorporated into the existing policy frameworks, are explained. The
book shows how multilateral frameworks (the Energy Charter Treaty
and the Energy Community Treaty) could contribute towards increased
security of transit, and how transit security threats can be reduced
through the joint employment of bilateral and multilateral frameworks.
This book is available at:
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/shop/the-transit-dimension-of-euenergy-security-russian-gas-transit-across-ukraine-belarus-and-moldova

James Henderson, November 2011. Domestic Gas Prices in
Russia – Towards Export Netback? The Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies.

The paper by James Henderson examines the domestic gas price
developments in Russia and the progress that has been made towards the
target set by Vladimir Putin for regulated gas prices to reach parity with
the European export netback price by 2011. The first sections of the
paper give a brief history of gas prices in Russia in the post-Soviet era
from 1991 to 2006 and discuss the introduction of the netback parity
target together with its implications for the Russian gas sector. Following
sections discuss the current state of the debate on domestic gas prices
and examine the implications of reaching a netback parity target by 2015.
The last two sections of this paper examine the impact of a number of
factors on domestic gas prices, including gas sector reform in Europe,
electricity sector reform in Russia and the ongoing diversification of a
number of gas producers into the power sector, the improving
economics of Russian gas production as the importance of nonGazprom producers grow, and many others. This paper concludes that
Russian domestic gas prices are not likely to reach European netback
levels any time soon, but that the momentum of the past five years
towards significantly higher domestic prices will continue, leading to an
eventual liberalization of the Russian gas market. Over the next decade,
this could create fundamental changes in Russia’s relationship with
European gas markets with potential competition for available supplies
between domestic and European export markets.
This paper is available at: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/
wp-content/uploads/2011/11/NG_57.pdf

David Buchan, October 2011. Expanding the European
dimension in energy policy: the Commission’s latest initiatives.
The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

This paper relates to events taking place at the European level to help the
European Union towards its ambitious 2020 energy and climate goals.
Specifically, this paper tracks the European Commissions’ initiatives in
2011 to streamline national planning approval of vital energy
infrastructure, to use EU funds to leverage more private finance for
energy projects, and to lend some reality to a common external energy
policy though Commission-led negotiations with foreign energy
suppliers on international infrastructure. This paper analyses the
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problems that the Commission initiatives seek to resolve, since these
initiatives awkwardly coincide with the eurozone crisis. David Buchan
broadly endorses Brussels’ attempt to kick-start implementation of
Europe’s 2020 energy and climate goals. He suggests the Commission go
a step further by taking advantage of the forthcoming treaty revision to
propose a constitutional amendment on EU states’ energy mix.
The paper is available at: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/
wp-content/uploads/2011/10/SP_23.pdf

WWF and Ecofys, December 2011. EU Climate Policy Tracker
2011.

Limiting the rise in the average global temperature to 2°C has been the
EU goal since 1996, and in December 2010 the UN recognised the need
to consider a 1.5°C limit. Avoiding overshooting these levels will require
massive emissions reductions – in the order of 80-95% for industrialized
countries, such as those in the EU. The next ten years are crucial in
establishing whether society will be able to make this transition, or
whether temperature increase limits will be irreversibly missed.
Last year, the European Union Climate Policy Tracker (EU CPT)
investigated each member state’s implementation of policy and
legislation, and rated their progress towards a 2050 vision of deep
decarbonisation using renewable energy. The uniquely developed rating
scheme, modelled on appliance efficiency labels (A-G, where G is the
lowest score), gave an indication of how member states were doing
compared to a ‘low-carbon policy package’. The average score was an ‘E’,
indicating that the level of effort needed to treble, to be on a pace to
reach the 2050 vision.
This report builds on last year’s EU CPT by giving an update on action
in member states, and an indicative trend in the rating, as well as adding
a new section on EU policy. The overall conclusion of this report is that
current efforts in Europe still remain insufficient to meet a low-carbon
vision.
This report is available at: http://www.climatepolicytracker.eu/

Ahmad Faruqui & Doug Mitarotonda, November 2011. Energy
Efficiency and Demand Response in 2020 –
A Survey of Expert Opinion. The Brattle Group.

Compared to the European Union, which has a definite target for energy
efficiency improvement by 2020, the US as a whole does not yet have
any similar targets. Nevertheless, some states such as Connecticut,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania have established specific numerical targets
while others, such as California, have made energy efficiency and
demand response part of their energy action plan.
The Brattle Group in cooperation with Global Energy Partners has
recently carried out a survey with the central question of “what is the
likely impact of energy efficiency and demand response going to be on
customer usage by the year 2020?” Almost 200 experts in the US and
Canada participated in this survey, representing various facets of the
industry – from academics to consultants, utilities to regulators and
consumer to environmental NGOs. The overall observation of this
survey was the following: “the experts expect that US electric
consumption will decline by between 5 and 15 percent by the year 2020,
compared to what it would have been in the absence of additional energy
efficiency measures. Concerning natural gas consumption, this savings
are in the range of 5 to 10 percent, compared to what is would have been
otherwise”.
All results of this survey are available at: http://www.brattle.com/_
documents/UploadLibrary/Upload990.pdf
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Conference Notes
IEA World Energy Outlook 2011 in the Hague

After an introduction of Maria van der Hoeven (chairmen IEA, former
Dutch minister of Economic Affairs), Fatih Birol (Chief Economist of
IEA) presented the most interesting findings:
Gas will be the ‘lucky’ fuel. It is the cleanest of the fossil fuels and is
relatively abundant, accessible and cheap. It is becoming more attractive
in light of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima and the resulting global
disinterest in nuclear energy and because of China’s plan to focus on
natural gas to meet increasing energy demand. Gas is lucky, because it
will benefit as the default fuel. According to Birol, the next age could be a
golden one for natural gas on the condition that the industry does
everything in their power to extract natural gas (conventional and shale)
in a sustainable and clean manner. Only if the industry will apply best
practice in regards to the environment (at 10-15% higher cost), than
unconventional gas has an important future in Europe especially.
Coal on the other hand, is the ‘forgotten’ fuel. On conferences and
energy events much is said about oil, gas, nuclear and renewables, but
not about coal despite the fact that it makes up 50% of global power
production. The share of coal used for power production will continue to
be large due to the demand of developing countries, such as China and
India.
The phase-out of nuclear in some countries and the decreased activity in
others is undesirable from both an environmental (more emission of
CO2 associated with fossil fuels) and an energy supply (energy supply is
less diversified) perspective.
Some 50% of global efforts to reduce climate change must come from
improved energy efficiency and the largest improvements can be made in
countries such as Russia.
The window of opportunity to act together against climate change to put
the world on a path leading to a temperature increase of 2 degrees
Celsius is closing fast. The world is 80% locked in on a path that leads to
a larger temperature increase. By the end of 2017, this certainty will be
100%, and all opportunity to get on a 2-degree path will be lost.

Symposium ‘Energie in 2030’

The first debate during this symposium dealt with real energy savings
and related issues. The saving of energy results in lower energy bills on
the household level. However, we tend to invest the saved money in
other energy-consuming products and services. The discussion focused
on the manner in which real energy savings can be achieved in the light
of this reality.
The next discussion was about ‘Obtaining insight into sustainability and
focused on the absence of a certification scheme in the energy sector. In
this regard, a certificate implies that the whole production process of
energy (it applies to the complete chain) meets certain standards. To
introduce such a scheme, the government should take the initiative
because companies do not really have an incentive to introduce such a
scheme themselves, according to the debaters.
The subject of the third discussion round was ‘between scarcity and
abundance’. It concerned the relationship between renewable sources of
energy, their implementation on shore, fossil sources of energy, their
continuous use and resulting (climate) problems in the future and, more
in general, what must be yielded in financial, environmental and spatial
terms.
The final debate was called ‘Towards a new model of earning money with
energy in 2030’ and dealt with the choices that must be made right now
in order to make money with energy in 2030. At this time point it is
expected that fossil fuels, natural gas in general will still play a dominant
role in the energy mix, next to the increased penetration of renewables.

Eurogas Annual Conference

The day started with an opening word after which Laurent David (GDF
Suez) presented the Eurogas Roadmap 2050. During the subsequent
discussion, it became clear that companies and institutions (IEA,
GasTerra, GDF Suez, WWF) see a prominent role for natural gas in the
future energy supply to reduce emissions until 2030. Following this,
there was a discussion about attracting investment in the European
internal market. It appeared that the regulatory framework supporting
the market is very uncertain, according to Domenico Dispenza (ENI),
which makes investment difficult. Next to this, the future natural gas
market will be characterized by a combination of long-term contracting
(only if it leads to a better functioning of the internal market) and spot
pricing, the EC stated.
Next, Fabrizio Barbaso (EC) gave an overview of the EU’s future
external energy policy. During the subsequent discussion it became clear
that the EU external energy policy is focussing on the governmental level
and not the company level. The goal is a better functioning of the internal
market and to achieve this, a better grip is needed on intergovernmental
agreements. The final speech of the day was held by Philipe Lowe. He
talked about the completion of the European internal energy market in
2014 and the further steps that must be taken to better the functioning of
the internal market, such as to further implement the 3rd Energy
Package, harmonising market and network operating rules and
enhancing investments in infrastructure.

Hamburg Intelligent Cities Expo

The first day at the Intelligent Cities Conference Hamburg focussed on
the smart city pilot programs already in operation and projects that are in
development. The main message that was conveyed in all presentations is
that Smart City and Smart Grid projects are a joint effort between
several parties. No single organisation or company is able to implement
this alone, beneficial cooperation is the main solution. Additionally,
Simon Giles of Accenture emphasized that the added value of smart
grids must be made apparent to all stakeholders in order to ensure their
adoption.
The second day of the Expo was devoted to governance issues
surrounding intelligent cities. Andreas Hermelink of Ecofys emphasized
that net-zero energy buildings need to compensate for others that cannot
be renovated sufficiently or cost effectively, such as historic, protected
buildings. Richard Bellingham from the University of Strathclyde
underscored the fact that cities must be designed in a resilient matter in
order to cope with socioeconomic change.
The third and final day of the Expo discussed intelligent mobility. Here,
Peter Lindlahr of Hysolutions discussed the changes in mobility implied
by social changes, such as the fact that newer generations are less
dedicated to the personal automobile. Generally, an emphasis was placed
on the examination of cities as an integrated space in order to achieve the
maximum level of integration and efficiency among the various modes of
transport and activities taking place. The success of congestion charges
was demonstrated by various examples, and the need to examine new
sources of revenue (due to the fact that less income will be generated
from road taxation) was discussed. Finally, a overarching theme present
throughout the conference was the importance of politicians
communicating to the public that significant increases in the prices of
energy are expected in the future, something that is not currently taking
place to a large enough extent.
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Conferences 2012
January

March

January 23-25: Berlin, Germany
Gas to Power Europe Forum
www.gastopowereurope.com/

March 6-7: Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Carbon Market Insights
www.pointcarbon.com/events/conferences/cmi2012/

January 23-25: West Sussex, UK
EU and UK Gas Security of Supply
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/en/conferences/policy-programmes/
european-union-and-its-neighbours/?view=Conference&id=592573782

March 6-8: Berlin, Germany
European Gas Market Forum
http://www.cvent.com/events/european-gas-market-forum/eventsummary-17f06992f6584036baac7adc4f18bc7c.aspx

January 24-27: Vienna, Austria
European Gas Conference 2012
http://www.theenergyexchange.co.uk/european-gas-conference2012/s13/a214/

March 13-14: Düsseldorf, Germany
Energy Storage
http://www.energy-storage-online.de/

January 25-26: London, UK
Esco Europe
www.esco-europe.com
January 26-27: Berlin, Germany
Gas Transport & Storage Summit 2012
http://www.gtsevent.com/

March 13-14: Barcelona, Spain
Unconventional Gas Forum 2012
http://www.ug-forum.com/
March 13-15: Rotterdam, the Netherlands
World Biofuels Markets 2012
www.worldbiofuelsmarkets.com/EF/?sSubSystem=Prospectus&
sEventCode=BF1203NL

January 31-February 1: Brussels, Belgium
EU Energy Law & Policy, 7th Annual Conference
http://www.euenergyconference.com/

March 21-22: Oslo, Norway
European LNG Forum
http://www.lngjournal.com/lng/index.php?option=com_k2&view=
item&layout=item&id=2057&Itemid=157

February

March 26-28: Moscow, Russia
Russia 2012 Offshore 7th Annual Conference & Exhibition
http://www.theenergyexchange.co.uk/russia-offshore-2012-7th-annualmeeting/s13/a244/

February 1-2: London, UK
Gas to Power
www.smi-online.co.uk/events/overview.asp?is=5&ref=3851
February 6-8: Istanbul, Turkey
EMEA Unconventional Gas Exploration and Production Forum
http://www.cvent.com/events/unconventional-gas-exploration-andproduction/event-summary-dff2d29a930f45a783f78363f130a8dd.aspx

March 26-29: Warsaw, Poland
Unconventional Gas & Oil Summit
http://www.informaglobalevents.com/event/unconventionals/
Accomodation

February 7-9: Essen, Germany
E-World Energy & Water 2012
http://www.e-world-2012.com/en/congress/programme/

March 26-29: London, UK
Smart Energy Management
http://www.terrapinn.com/2012/smart-energy-management-worldeurope/

February 8: London, UK
Carbon Capture & Storage Forum
http://marketforce.eu.com/Conferences/ccs12/?utm_source=www.
euagenda.eu&utm_medium=event_calendar&utm_campaign=ccs12

March 27-29: Marcliffe, Aberdeen, UK
Oil & Gas Outlook North Sea
http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/ourservices/upcoming-conferences-and-seminars

February 8-10: Marseille, France
Global Energy Forum
oilgas.flemingeurope.com/global-lng-forum/

March 29: London, UK
The Smart Utility Forum
http://marketforce.eu.com/Conferences/smartutility12/

February 29 – March 2: Wels, Austria
World Sustainable Energy Days
www.wsed.at/en/programme/
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April

June

April 16-20: Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Flame 2012
http://www.informaglobalevents.com/event/flame-conference

June 4-8: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
25th World Gas Conference
http://www.wgc2012.com/

April 17-20: Maastricht, the Netherlands
2nd European Energy Conference
http://energy-conference.eu/

June 12-14: Rome, Italy
International Energy Program Evaluation Conference
www.iepec.org/?page_id=975

April 16-18: Trondheim, Norway
Technoport 2012
http://technoport.no/conference-2012/

June 12-14: Cologne, Germany
Renewable Energy World Europe 2012
http://www.renewableenergyworld-europe.com/index.html

April 26-27: Copenhagen, Denmark
Annual Euroheat & Power Conference
http://conference2012.eu/

June 18-22:
20th European Biomass Conference & Exhibition
http://www.conference-biomass.com/

May
May 10-12: Florence, Italy
International Conference on the European Energy Market
http://eem12.org/
May 14-16 or April 22-25: Berlin, Germany
B4E Business for the Environment – Global Summit 2012
http://www.b4esummit.com/
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